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Since the turn of the twentieth century, the black population of Harlem grew extensively, 
but even as black residents became the majority in this area, they were economically influenced 
by outsiders. During the Great Depression, the need to resist economic exploitation grew as 
poverty intensified.  Though in the early twentieth century Harlem had developed into a black 
metropolis, the majority of landlords and business owners were whites living outside Harlem.  
Few businesses were owned or managed by black businessmen. Both goods and housing prices 
were often higher in Harlem than in other areas of New York City. Many companies also limited 
job opportunities for black workers to menial positions. Residents of Harlem resisted this 
exploitation by forming organizations and protest movements to combat economic injustice. 
New York’s African-American community had been marginalized both socially and 
economically long before the onset of Harlem as a black neighborhood, and this pattern of 
control was perpetuated with Harlem’s creation. Harlem’s African-American population 
frequently fought to gain control of its community during the 1920’s and 1930's.  African-
American residents of Harlem during this period struggled to increase social, political, and 
economic opportunities.  Reform efforts were frequently rebuffed by New York’s white 
community and commonly ignored by local government. Whites, primarily of Central and 
Eastern European descent, as well as Italians, owned Harlem’s businesses, residential 
developments and held positions in government. In this capacity, whites in these positions 
increased prices, limited access to employment and ignored attempts to increase legislation to 
improve conditions in Harlem. Such efforts by black residents included the tenant campaign for 
lower rent and better housing conditions, which picketed and appealed to landlords, courts, and 
government officials to improve housing and the New York Urban League’s (NYUL) letter-
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writing campaign to pressure businesses to hire more black staff. These endeavors failed to 
improve the quality and cost of housing or secure a meaningful increase in black employment.  
This inability to effect significant change further divided black residents from white outsiders.  
White opportunists continued to influence the everyday lives of Harlem’s inhabitants, further 
fueling hostilities.  As black attempts to achieve agency were rejected, tensions between black 
residents and white business owners grew and eventually exploded during the Harlem riot of 
1935.  
Race riots, such as the Harlem riot of 1935, are not isolated events, but are a reflection of 
the conflicts that precipitate them.  As sociologist Cathy Lisa Schneider purports, “If social 
movements, courts, or other institutions offer alternative paths to justice, no matter how limited, 
riots are rare. Riots are the last resort for those who find all other paths to justice blocked.” 1 As a 
marginalized community, Harlem developed efforts to combat injustice but achieved little 
meaningful change. In the early 1930’s, Harlem’s community members joined various 
organizations, led boycotts, picketed stores, led rent strikes, and appealed to local government 
figures such as Mayor Fiorello H. LaGuardia.  Many of their efforts were focused not just on 
racial equality but on economic opportunities that were resisted by the white community, ignored 
by the government, or blocked in court decisions.  Tensions increased, police enforced social 
norms, and this occasionally resulted in open conflict.2 
This study seeks to view 1935 Harlem as a case study of how marginalized communities 
have attempted to address an injustice, sought resolution through peaceful means, and how 
                                               
1 Cathy Lisa Schneider, Police Power and Race Riots: Urban Unrest in Paris and New York (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 4.  
2 For more information, see Shannon King, Whose Harlem is This, Anyway?: Community Politics and Grassroots 
Activism during the New Negro Era (New York: New York University Press, 2017). 
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unfulfilled expectations for change led to rising tensions and riots.  Though the people of Harlem 
planned and instituted many efforts to improve conditions, including establishing rent strikes, 
letter writing initiatives, and “vote black” movements, this work will focus on the “Don’t Buy 
Where You Can’t Work” campaign that began in 1934. The movement, which began in the 
North, protested hiring inequality by picketing and boycotting stores with discriminatory hiring 
practices.  The marginal success of the “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work Movement” and the 
eventual reversal of employment gains increased community tensions, which led to riots that 
targeted Harlem’s business district. 
I have chosen Harlem as a case study for four reasons. First, Harlem’s formation as a 
ghetto is a glaring example of economic exploitation.  Harlem, which began as a white 
community, was designed to appeal to middle-class and upper-class white New Yorkers around 
the turn of the nineteenth century.  As a result, homes were spacious, built on tree-lined streets, 
and well-maintained.  It was a desirable community which provided easy access to the rest of 
New York.  As black New Yorkers began to move in the early twentieth century, however, a 
stark contrast emerged as homes were subdivided, public spaces became limited, and homes 
quickly fell into disrepair.  Despite the diminishing quality of housing, housing prices soared, 
lining the pockets of absentee landlords in the 1920’s and 1930’s.  Businesses within Harlem 
also capitalized on black residents, often charging exorbitant prices for basic goods, while 
refusing to hire members of the black community.  This exploitation of residents only intensified 
as the Great Depression ravaged Harlem.  
The second reason Harlem provides an interesting case study is that while members of 
Harlem represented a diverse black community, they were equally affected by injustice and 
lacked agency within their community during the first half of the twentieth century.  Harlem 
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drew residents from throughout the city, the country, and the world.  Black New Yorkers from 
all economic backgrounds were pushed out of other residential neighborhoods and forced to 
make Harlem their home.3 Black residents were denied access to more desirable neighborhoods 
as a result of discrimination.  Subsequently, Harlem became home for black residents from all 
economic backgrounds in the 1920’s and 1930’s. Harlem’s black professionals and clergymen 
lived between 138th and 139th Street, while lower class residents were more likely to inhabit 130th 
to 140th Street.  Those who were not native to New York were also driven to Harlem’s borders, 
due to discrimination.  Many migrated from the South to New York, seeking to escape political, 
social, and economic oppression in areas of the country that benefited from the exploitation of 
black farm workers. Black southerners left those areas to seek new opportunities. Though they 
saw improved conditions in New York, equal status was still denied to them, despite the illusion 
of splendor and opportunities during the Harlem Renaissance of the 1920’s.   
Thirdly, Harlem provides an example of how black residents sought and developed 
methods for agency in their community.   The zeal for economic, political, and social reform had 
been present since the creation of Harlem as a black community, but it intensified beginning in 
the 1930’s as economic tensions grew.   Evidence of this drive for reform can be seen in the 
Federal Writers’ Project’s book on New York City, which states, “Because of its highly sensitive 
social and political temper, Harlem has been termed the ‘focal point in the struggle for the 
liberation of the Negro people’”4  The people of Harlem participated in myriad activities to push 
for reform.  These activities and struggles against injustice are well described by the Federal 
Writers’ Project: 
                                               
3 Nat Brandt, Harlem at War: The Black Experience in WWII (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 28-35. 
4 WPA Federal Writers’ Project, New York Panorama (New York: Random House, 1938), 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015007194833;view=1up;seq=179.   
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In the consciousness of this oppressed community, current events are commonly 
interpreted as gains and set-backs for the Negro people.  This social restlessness results in 
many public demonstrations.  Harlemites in increasing numbers attend street meetings 
protesting evictions; picket stores to compel the hiring of Negroes, or WPA offices to 
indicate disapproval of cuts in pay or personnel; parade against the subjection of colonial 
peoples, or to celebrate some new civic improvement and march many miles in May Day 
demonstrations5  
In addition to these activities, Harlemites joined in various church-led efforts, joined political 
organizations such as the Young Communist League, and listened to street corner orators. 
Though many of these actions were not unique to Harlem, the activities of Harlem were followed 
by black communities throughout the country and sometimes emulated.   
Finally, the Harlem riot of 1935 was exceptional in that it would create a new pattern of 
rioting.  Though there have been many race riots in American history, the Harlem riot of 1935 is 
significant because it targeted economic symbols of oppression after efforts to assert agency had 
failed. Previous violent clashes, such as the riot of 1900 in the Tenderloin District in which gangs 
of whites attacked black New Yorkers after the death of a white officer, were usually led by the 
white community and inflicted on black communities.6  In Harlem, blacks initiated rioting in 
response to perceived injustices, which were often sparked by rumors. As historian Paul A. Gilje 
explains, property was targeted because in a consumer-oriented society, property represented 
status and privilege. Damaging property was not seen as a destruction of the community of 
Harlem, but expressed “a rejection of middle-class values that poor urbanites found constantly 
denied to them…[I]t was the destruction of property of some individual that lived outside the 
ghetto.”7   
                                               
5 Ibid. 
6 Richard Hofstadter and Michael Wallace, ed., American Violence: A Documentary History (New York: Alfred 
Knopf, 1970), 258. 
7 Paul A. Gilje, Rioting in America (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 160. 
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Harlemites also targeted other symbols of oppression and were generally focused on the 
police. Police were often seen as the enforcers of their oppression.  As historian Jules Archers 
contends, there was “resentment of white patrols in the black community. Blacks saw them not 
as protectors but as guards confining them to the ghettos.”8 Police, like property, represented the 
oppression of Harlem’s people. Rioters were not specifically attacking police and destroying 
property, but were responding to tensions that had been lurking beneath the surface after a series 
of attempts to enact meaningful action had failed, leaving no other channels to vent frustration.    
Section one of this study will explore the development of Harlem as a ghetto.  It will 
consider how changes in the late nineteenth century transformed Harlem from a community 
developed for whites into a black metropolis. I will explore how ghetto conditions formed.  
These conditions were a result of white exploitation of the black community and discriminatory 
housing practices, which prevented movement into other areas.  This section will also focus on 
how conditions were exacerbated by the Great Depression, further creating ghetto conditions.   
Section two will discuss how community members worked together to bring about 
economic uplift for their community. It will focus on the “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” 
campaign, which brought together community members of all backgrounds to participate in a 
singular effort. These efforts were thwarted by business leaders, the courts, and police who 
enforced restrictions on participants. And such efforts led to increased tensions, which 
contributed to the riot of 1935.  
Finally, I will examine the events that precipitated the riot and the effects of the Harlem 
riot of 1935. I will consider the factors that ignited the violence and analyze why rioters targeted 
                                               
8 Jules Archer, Riot! A History of Mob Action in the United States (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1974), 21. 
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135th Street. This section will also examine how New York City government responded to the 
crisis and how that affected the Harlem community.   
Harlem’s Transformation from White Suburb to Black Metropolis: 
 Beginning in the late 1800’s, Harlem was transformed from a rural community into a 
sprawling, bustling, and prosperous neighborhood, which became more connected to the rest of 
New York City.  Harlem’s transition into a fashionable enclave occurred between 1878 and 
1881.  The metamorphosis of Harlem from a rural retreat to suburban splendor came as a result 
of a growth in transportation.  During this period, three elevated train lines were expanded to 
reach to 129th Street and Seventh Avenue.  Shortly after, in 1886, the elevated train lines were 
expanded further north.9  Newly available transportation created a permanent link between 
Harlem and the rest of New York City and enticed new residents and developers. 
Not long after the expansion of the elevated train lines, developers created an abundance 
of appealing housing for white residents.   Streets were well-planned, tree-lined, and wide, 
providing a sense of space not available elsewhere in Manhattan. This design, along with the 
convenience of electric lights and telephones, aimed to attract new tenants.10  Exclusive 
apartments and townhouses were erected to lure potential residents.  Most apartments in the area 
were no more than six stories high and included features designed to attract wealthy and upper-
middle class residents.  Features included elevators, servants’ quarters, porches, and driveways. 
Some homes boasted ten to sixteen rooms.11  These appealing features attracted older and 
wealthier whites to the area, though lower-class whites lived on the fringes of Harlem’s borders.  
                                               
9 Gilbert Osofsky, Harlem the Making of a Ghetto: Negro New York, 1890-1930 Second Edition (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1971), 75. 
10 Osofsky, Harlem the Making of a Ghetto, 76. 
11 Osofsky, Harlem the Making of a Ghetto, 78. 
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Harlem’s less lucrative occupants lived in tenements filled with new immigrants, such as 
Italians, Eastern European Jews, and some black residents.            
 The change in Harlem from a largely exclusive white area to a predominantly black 
neighborhood did not begin to occur until the early 1900’s as housing speculation failed to meet 
expectations.  Once again, the transformation of Harlem resulted from the expansion of 
transportation. In 1904, the West Side IRT expansion into Harlem was complete.  Prior to the 
finalization of the new section of the train line, land speculators hurried to acquire land at rapidly 
increasing prices.12 Many had assumed that with a new train line connecting Harlem to lower 
Manhattan, a housing boom would soon follow, as it did with prior extensions of train lines to 
the region.  Land developers quickly built new apartments to meet the anticipated demand. 
Unfortunately for these property-owners, the expected demand never materialized.  During this 
time, the American economy was experiencing a financial downturn, and the demand for luxury 
housing declined.  Even more moderate housing options failed to attract the projected migration 
of city residents from other parts of the city as rents were significantly higher in Harlem. Older 
residents, such as the Jewish population of Harlem, began to move to suburbs, adding more 
homes to the already saturated housing market.13 Consequently, landlords held a glut of empty 
apartments and extravagant mortgages. In order to entice white occupants, landlords offered 
incentives such as a few rent-free months of occupancy. In spite of this, apartments remained 
vacant. Unable to attract white residents, many in the area chose to rent or sell to black residents 
rather than face financial devastation. This transition did not come easily as white residents 
resisted this demographic change.  
                                               
12 Brandt, Harlem at War, 27. 
13 Cheryl Lynn Greenberg, Or Does It Explode? Black Harlem in the Great Depression (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991),14. 
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 Black New Yorkers pushing into Harlem’s borders during the early twentieth century 
were met with resistance from property owners and fellow residents. Fearful landowners, afraid 
of declining property values, pressured mortgage brokers to decline loans to black customers.14 
Similarly, restrictive covenants were signed by white proprietors stating they would not sell or 
rent to black occupants. Neighborhood associations were also formed to create a color barrier in 
Harlem.15 Despite these efforts, the overabundance of vacant housing made it futile to maintain 
an exclusively white Harlem.   
 Beginning in 1904, Philip Payton opened the doors for large-scale black settlement in 
Harlem. Payton, a graduate of Livingston College in North Carolina, moved to New York where 
he worked as a janitor in a local real estate office.16   Payton saw the deplorable housing 
available to New York’s black community, as well as the excess housing market in Harlem as an 
opportunity. He purchased land on 134th Street and Fifth Avenue and offered good-quality 
housing for the first time to black tenants in Harlem.  These apartments were rented to black 
tenants at ten percent above the now deflated market value.17  Black New Yorkers leapt at the 
opportunity to acquire quality housing. They were willing to move to Harlem, while others were 
not because de facto segregation limited their housing options. Quality housing was denied to 
them as a result. 
 Payton’s early success in renting to black tenants led him to expand his enterprise, 
drawing more investors to his real estate agency, which targeted black customers known as the 
                                               
14 Michael Flamm, In the Heat of the Summer: The New York Riots of 1964 and the War on Crime (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), 31. 
15 Ibid.  
16  Jervis Anderson, This Was Harlem: A Cultural Portrait, 1900-1950 (New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux, 1991), 
51-53. 
17 Ibid. 
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Afro-Am Realty Company.18 Other landlords followed Payton’s lead, renting and selling to black 
lodgers. As black occupants moved in, however, white residents began to move out in greater 
numbers, leaving a black majority in much of Harlem.  
 As new inhabitants clustered into Harlem, not only did the number of black people in the 
area grow, but so, too, did the borders of Harlem itself. Before 1905, the population residing 
north of 125th Street was less than 4,000; by 1920, the black population in this area alone totaled 
84,000.19  This expansion of Harlem’s borders formed the area today known as Central Harlem, 
from 135th Street, east of Eighth Avenue.  Black Harlem, which had once been a restricted 
community,20 materialized as a dominant section between Park Avenue and Amsterdam Avenue, 
north from Central Park to 155th Street. Within these borders, two-thirds of New York City’s 
black population was housed, numbering approximately 190,000 black occupants.21 
 Though many black residents moved to Harlem to escape poor living conditions and find 
better housing, others were forced to move within its borders. Prior to black settlement in 
Harlem, most of New York’s black community resided in low-quality, over-populated housing in 
the West Fifties and Sixties, as well as the Tenderloin district located from 24th Street to 42nd 
Street, bordering Fifth and Seventh Avenues. As the population in the Tenderloin District 
swelled during the first decade of the twentieth century, many were pushed out and displaced as 
a result of the construction of Pennsylvania Station. Since many areas throughout the city 
practiced de facto segregation, many blacks were forced to live in one of the only areas available 
                                               
18 Ibid. 
19 Greenberg, Or Does It Explode?, 15.  
20 Many communities, including Harlem, blocked blacks looking to obtain a home in a predominately white area by 
creating restrictive covenants, agreements between property owners denying property rentals or sales to black home 
seekers. Though these agreements could not be legally upheld after a 1917 Supreme Court ruling in Buchanan v. 
Warley, they were privately made into the latter half of the twentieth century. 
21 Ibid. 
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to them, Harlem.  Others seized economic opportunities.  As development efforts in the 
Tenderloin District materialized in response to the building of Pennsylvania Station, many in the 
area sold their businesses and moved uptown with their profits. Most living in the area of the 
Tenderloin District had only loose ties to New York.   Here most residents had only recently 
arrived in New York and were primarily single. Beginning in 1900, these individuals willingly 
moved farther uptown, where for the first time they were offered decent living accommodations 
in New York City. 
Though many migrated from lower sections of Manhattan, a large percentage of 
Harlem’s new residents came as a result of migration from southern cities, driven by the search 
for economic opportunities and the lure of independent black culture.  As America entered 
World War I, opportunities seemed to increase for black workers.  During this time, European 
immigration was halted, and many black laborers migrated from the South to New York, hoping 
to replace them. This steady stream of southern migrants increased as America headed into the 
Great Depression.  Between 1920 and 1930, the white population of Manhattan had declined by 
18 percent, while the black population of New York increased by 115 percent, 25 percent of 
whom were born outside New York.22 These migrants were drawn to Harlem because of a lack 
of job opportunities in the South and limited aid for the growing number of unemployed.  Others 
from the South sought shelter in Harlem because they believed they would experience less 
discrimination and be able to participate in a truly black community, which offered a wealth of 
culture due to the Harlem Renaissance. 
                                               
22 Osofsky, Harlem the Making of a Ghetto, 128-9. 
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Though much of Harlem’s expanding non-white population came as a result of 
segregation and southern migration, others came from more distant locales, but contributed to the 
changing population of Harlem nonetheless. Those from the West Indies, who were free to 
immigrate due to a lack of immigration quotas on their home countries, found new dwellings in 
Harlem.  Adding to Harlem’s population was the migration of people of Puerto Rican descent, 
which had grown to 45,000 by 1930.23  
In less than fifty years, Harlem had changed from a suburban white community into a 
cosmopolitan black community. This shift occurred as a result of land speculation, which offered 
opportunities for black residents that had not existed before.  Blacks migrated to Harlem from 
various destinations seeking greater opportunity. The prospects of a better life in Harlem were 
often dashed by the reality of life there, as ghetto conditions emerged and the national economy 
declined.  
Life and Employment in Harlem 
            After the shift in demographics in Harlem, the once grand homes quickly became 
overcrowded.  By 1914, 50,000 black residents lived in Harlem.24 This growth was in part due to 
the movement of people from other parts of Manhattan. Many property owners refused to rent or 
sell to black tenants and prospective buyers outside of Harlem, while real estate agencies steered 
them toward primarily black communities.   Almost 70 percent of black Manhattanites were 
living in Harlem by the end of World War I.25 This growth in population not only came from 
black settlers from other parts of Manhattan, but also from migrants from southern states and 
West Indian immigration.   
                                               
23 Osofsky, Harlem the Making of a Ghetto, 130. 
24 Osofsky, Harlem the Making of a Ghetto, 105. 
25 Brandt, Harlem at War, 28. 
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 Approximately six million southern black migrants came to the north during the Great 
Migration from 1916 to 1970.  They came seeking economic opportunity and to escape 
discriminatory laws in the south.26 Subsequently, Harlem’s population grew 600 percent between 
1910 and 1935.27 Although the population expanded, the territory and number of abodes did not 
grow. Developers built seventy-five percent of the housing in Harlem prior to 1900.28   This 
concentration of population in such a limited space would soon strain living conditions and help 
drive up the price of housing.  
Residents who could not afford unreasonable rents often took in boarders.  Rent for 
lodgings in Harlem was high, standing at $14 to $18 per room, compared to the $12 to $15 paid 
for similar accommodations in other parts of Manhattan. This forced residents to take in other 
renters.29 As author Claude McKay noted in 1940, “The prohibitive rent makes the unit of 
private family life the rarest of thing. Almost all families take in lodgers. All available space 
must be occupied… Adequate clothing and even vital food must be sacrificed to meet the high 
cost of housing.”30 Many of the co-tenants who rented rooms were single people who came 
because of the Great Migration.   This doubling up of inhabitants only worsened as Depression-
era economic conditions further strained family resources, leading to two and three families 
living in apartments designed to accommodate only one. The need to take additional occupants 
became more essential as employment prospects declined during the Depression.  
Job opportunities for those living in Harlem were inadequate, partly due to a shortage of 
businesses there. Harlem’s development as a residential community meant that Harlem had a 
                                               
26 For more information on the Great Migration see Nicholas Lemann, The Promised Land: The Great Black 
Migration and How it Changed America (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1991). 
27 Brandt, Harlem at War, 39. 
28 Osofsky, Harlem the Making of a Ghetto, 137. 
29 Greenberg, Or Does It Explode?, 29. 
30 Claude McKay, Harlem: Negro Metropolis (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1940), 29. 
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scant number of businesses. The lack of retailers in Harlem meant fewer open positions were 
available compared to other parts of the city.  Those businesses located in Harlem were not 
black-owned and discriminated against black applicants.  
Adding to the scarcity of work in Harlem was the lack of black-owned establishments.  
Prior to the Depression, blacks believed a falsehood that three-fourths of Harlem’s real estate 
was owned by blacks and thought they had some control over economic activities there. In 
reality, blacks held less than 20 percent of all businesses in Harlem.31 In 1930, Harlem had 
twelve thousand retail stores, but only 391 were black-owned and more than half were grocery 
stores.32 Black business owners, therefore, controlled only a fraction of the economic potential of 
Harlem.  
The negligible number of black-owned places of commerce was a result of several 
factors.  First, white real estate owners refused to rent retail storefronts to black entrepreneurs 
and those who did charged excessively high rents. Second, these businesses often were costlier to 
operate and in turn received fewer customers.  Since black-owned businesses were small and 
could not order in bulk like the chain stores in Harlem, prices tended to be higher and many 
black residents felt they were taken advantage of.33  Finally, black entrepreneurs found it more 
difficult to get loans since most banks were white-owned.34 This inability to raise capital made 
starting businesses more difficult. The lack of black-owned businesses meant that people who 
did not live in Harlem owned the majority of the businesses there. 
                                               
31 Osofsky, Harlem the Making of a Ghetto, 137. 
32 Brandt, Harlem at War, 37.  
33 King, Whose Harlem is This, Anyway?, 26-7. 
34 E. Franklin Frazier, “Negro Harlem: An Ecological Study,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 43 No. 1 (July., 
1937): 87, accessed February 8, 2016, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2768234.  
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Outsiders tended to own Harlem’s stores and hired people not from the community.  A 
majority of businesses were Jewish-owned.35  Jews had settled in Harlem before black occupants 
moved to the area.  Though Jews moved out as blacks moved in, they continued to operate their 
businesses in the area.36 These businesses tended to hire blacks only in menial positions and 
rarely hired black retail workers. 
In addition to a dearth of accessible retail positions for blacks, Harlemites found it 
difficult to find positions due to the inaccessibility of union employment. Due to discrimination, 
vacant positions had always been easier for white immigrants to obtain than for black migrants.37 
Unions, for example, often refused to admit black members.38 These organizations often had 
exclusionary clauses in their constitutions, which barred black workers from gaining 
employment. Those that did not include such phrases excluded black apprentices or charged 
exorbitant membership dues, which limited their access to membership and therefore access to 
union jobs.39 These restrictions to union entry barred black workers from obtaining many 
positions.   
Even in government positions, black jobseekers found openings to be constrained. 
Though 4.7 percent of New York City’s population was black, city employment statistics did not 
reflect an equal percentage of representation in city jobs.  In 1930, black staffers held only 2.7 
percent of public sector jobs.40  In 1935, laws required state and city contracts to include anti-
                                               
35 Flamm, In the Heat of the Summer, 34. 
36 Greenberg, Or Does It Explode, 127.  
37 King, Whose Harlem is This, Anyway?, 62. 
38 Hofstadter and Wallace, American Violence, 259. 
39 King, Whose Harlem is This, Anyway?, 67. 
40 Larry A. Green, "Harlem, the Depression Years: Leadership and Social Conditions," Afro-Americans in New York 
Life and History, vol. 17, no. 2, 1993: 33, accessed June 29, 2018, ProQuest. 
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discrimination clauses.  In spite of this legislation, black public employment did not show any 
significant increase.41 
Even black professionals found it difficult to obtain employment.  Many of the Caribbean 
migrants that settled in Harlem came as experienced, skilled professionals.  Between 1920 and 
1930, the number of black professionals had doubled, yet during the Depression the black skilled 
workforce decreased by 50 percent.42 Signs of this decline were evident before the start of the 
Great Depression.  For example, the New York Urban League’s Employment Bureau aimed its 
efforts at increasing white-collar employment and in 1926 was able to place 35 percent of 
applicants, but by 1928, could only place 19 percent.43 Many middle-class occupations saw 
significantly higher unemployment levels for black candidates than white.  For instance, 25.8 
percent of black teachers were seeking employment, while only 5 percent of white teachers were 
in the same position.44  Black medical staff even found it difficult to obtain appointments in city 
hospitals. In 1929, Harlem hospital had 57 white doctors but only seven black doctors on staff, 
despite 300 applicants; similarly, black nurses could only attend two all-black training schools in 
New York City.45  With little prospects in white-collar employment, many turned to menial 
positions.  
Black women unable to find other means of employment turned to domestic service. 
Housework required hard labor and long hours but it was the only position available to many 
black women during the Depression. Many black women had avoided these positions because of 
the live-in requirement of many bosses or the long hours, which took them away from their 
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families.46 In this capacity, they worked as janitresses, laundresses, chambermaids, pantry maids, 
and housemaids.  A product of the availability of domestic employment for women was that 
more women held non-relief jobs than men in New York City. 
Black men faced discriminatory hiring practices and a significant rise in unemployment.  
In 1930, black and white male employment rates in New York City were almost equal at less 
than a 1 percent difference, but this soon changed.  By 1940, the white male employment rate 
had decreased by 5.4 percent since 1930, but black males saw a reduction of 20.5 percent since 
1930.47 Blacks in New York were “displaced from private employment at twice the rates of 
whites and were being re-employed at only one-half the rate of whites.”48 Frequently, the jobs 
that blacks were able to secure were at lower occupational levels.  
Many black jobseekers could only find lower status work and found the only available 
occupations for them were as porters or elevator operators.  By 1930, porters and elevator 
operators were the two principal categories of employment for black men. Salaries for these 
positions were typically low.  
Black wage earners consistently grossed below subsistence incomes, but these wages 
declined further with the onset of the Depression. In the 1920’s, President Hoover’s Conference 
on Home Building and Home Ownership reported that the average black family household 
earned $1300 a year in New York City, about $25 a week, while the average white family in 
New York City earned $1750.49 Comparatively, to live on maintenance level in New York City, 
the average New Yorker needed an income of $1375 a year.50 By 1932, the League of Mothers 
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Club found that the median income for employed black families had dropped to an average of 
$1049.51   
Earning an income to meet the cost of living in Harlem became increasingly difficult as 
wages fell after the onset of the Depression. In 1931, typical wages in fields open to blacks 
reflected the decreasing wages. Some sample salaries are as followed: factory workers earned 
$7-$12 a week, domestics received a maximum of $15 a week, and day workers earned between 
$2 and $6 a day.52   Earnings in every sector of black employment declined.  Black skilled 
workers received a 50 percent decrease, black laborers’ yearly incomes dropped by a third as 
compared to pre-Depression earnings, a startling reduction considering that 84 percent of black 
Harlemites fell into the category of laborers.53   Given the high unemployment rates and the 
substantial decrease in income, it is evident that the people of Harlem required substantial aid for 
survival.  
Private relief agents immediately felt the need for increased aid early in the Depression 
era. Almost 50 percent of all families in Harlem would rely on relief services by 1933.54 Most 
relief applicants had never applied for aid before. Though Harlem’s need for aid was high, 
resources available were far below what was needed. 
Both public and private aid increased significantly, but still lagged behind the needs of 
the city. Families on Emergency Relief only received $28.04 a month despite average, expenses 
totaling $87.75.55  It was not until 1932 that the Home Relief Bureau was established, and still 
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not all applicants received assistance and funds were slow to be released. Aside from the 
limitations in funding, whites gained benefits more frequently than did blacks.  
Though black Harlemites benefited from aid, for various reasons, they did not obtain 
enough to meet their needs. First, less aid was available for black New Yorkers.  Few private 
agencies provided services for blacks. Secondly, most agencies, both public and private, had 
criteria for qualifications in their programs that excluded blacks.56  Only one-fourth of black 
households qualified due to prescriptive criteria for help, while two-thirds of white families were 
eligible.57 One example of this type of exclusionary prerequisite was residency requirements.  
Though not overly discriminatory toward black New Yorkers, this stopped many from getting 
aid because many black residents had recently settled in Harlem from the American South or 
West Indies. With the significant lack of financial support in Harlem, the general welfare of 
Harlem began to decline.  
Harlem’s economic despair exacerbated the deteriorating physical and mental health of 
those living there. A study conducted between October 1930 and May 1931 by the Welfare 
Council of the City of New York concluded that unemployment led to increased overcrowding, 
poor health and diet, as well as psychological strain. These conditions bred illness.  As a result of 
these circumstances, Harlem’s residents lived without heat in dwellings not designed for 
habitation, consumed a poor diet, were less likely to seek medical attention, and suffered severe 
psychological strain.58 It is not surprising, then, that Harlem also had the highest tuberculosis rate 
in New York City and higher than average mortality rates.59 Black Harlemites death rates were 
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forty percent higher than the rest of the city and black Harlemites were two times more likely to 
die in every age category.60   
Despite the crushing lack of employment opportunities, appropriate medical access, and 
financial assistance, the city did little to remedy the suffering of black New Yorkers.  Funding 
was grossly inadequate for aid and discriminatory hiring practices often stripped black 
Harlemites of the chance to access gainful employment and reduced their status in the 
community.  Black New Yorkers turned to charitable organizations for aid, but when this failed 
to bring satisfactory relief, they turned to more radical organizing efforts.  Their energies focused 
on gaining employment opportunities in Harlem in order to relieve the communities suffering.  
Harlem’s “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” campaign was the product of these efforts. 
Origins of the “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” Campaign 
Though many northern cities during the 1930’s participated in “Don’t Buy Where You 
Can’t Work” campaigns, the roots of these movements originated in Chicago. Beginning in 
1929, Chicago launched the “Jobs for Negroes” campaign also known as the “Don’t Buy Where 
You Can’t Work” campaign. This movement attempted to address a common concern, the 
economic advancement of the black community by using mass protests and direct action.  The 
first group to use these methods was the Illinois Civics Association, which attempted to pressure 
white businesses on the South Side of Chicago to hire black workers by engaging in picket lines 
in front of their stores. The movement gained much support in the black community to some 
degree due to the backing of a black weekly known as the Chicago Whip.   Chicago experienced 
a few early successes. Small local businesses expanded job opportunities for blacks and a 
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number of larger companies such as Woolworths and A&P, which had previously resisted hiring 
blacks changed their stance.61  These early successes inspired other areas. 
Chicago’s achievement in securing jobs inspired direct action throughout the country, but 
failed to create lasting success. This campaign would spread to 35 cities in total (including 
Harlem), uniting diverse populations previously divided by class. Some examples of 
participating cities included Washington, D.C., St. Louis, and Baltimore.  The NAACP and the 
National Urban League failed to bring about meaningful change using traditional methods such 
as interracial cooperative efforts, education, lobbying, legislation, and negotiation. This led to 
many calling for a more radical approach to achieving equality.62  
The “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” campaign provided what seemed to many 
cities a viable alternative.  The shift to direct action was not only inspired by the Chicago gains, 
but also by the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act in 1932, which permitted 
picketing in the event of a labor dispute.63   Most of these campaigns failed, however. They 
frequently led to white backlash and court challenges, which usually sided with white business 
owners on the basis that businesses should be free to choose their own employees.64  Many 
efforts came to a halt as courts ruled that the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act did not apply 
to picketers since they were neither a business nor a labor union.65  The early success of this 
movement would set the model for Harlem to develop its own “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t 
Work” movement.  
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Early Jobs Campaigns in Harlem 
  The few jobs for blacks and a need for black enterprise in Harlem was a subject of 
concern for residents long before the onset of the Great Depression.  As discussed earlier, most 
retailers in Harlem were white-owned and black entrepreneurs found it difficult to compete.  
Though Harlem had become a black community, only 29 percent of these white-owned 
businesses employed blacks, and of these most hired blacks solely in menial positions.66  
Throughout the 1920’s, articles were printed in the New York Age, a prominent black newspaper 
of the era, which expressed concern over the lack of black businesses and discriminatory hiring 
practices of white-owned establishments. One investigation of these conditions found that in all 
of the stores in Harlem, only 129 black workers held jobs and almost all in menial positions.67  
Adding further to inhabitants’ fury was the assertion that customers did not feel comfortable 
making purchases from black employees and that black workers lacked the skills to work as 
clerks. That same year, the New York Urban League (NYUL) and other organizations began 
campaigns to compel local businesses to hire black employees.  
These mostly middle-class efforts to appoint more blacks in local stores were a failure, 
due to their conservative approach.  The NYUL began its effort in November 1926, but used 
indirect methods to compel white shopkeepers to employ blacks. The NYUL wrote letters to 
businesses and conducted a survey of 300 stores on their positions on hiring blacks.  In January 
1930, the NYUL facilitated the formation of the Harlem Housewives League, which helped 
collect receipts to show how much business black customers brought to their stores. The Negro 
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League for Equal Poharlemlitical and Civic Rights also tried to persuade a small group of 
Harlem businesses to employ blacks. Both efforts had failed.68 The NYUL efforts only 
succeeded in placing four employees in non-menial positions, while the Negro League for Equal 
Political and Civic Rights futile attempts gained no jobs.  
The NAACP tried similar methods, to no avail.  This organization focused on a “New 
Economic Program” that attempted to increase jobs for blacks by negotiating with white 
businesses throughout New York City, which operated in black neighborhoods.69  The NAACP 
wanted an increase in jobs for blacks but did not want to see this happen at the expense of 
currently employed whites.  They urged businesses to hire blacks as part of the National 
Recovery Administration and even considered initiating a boycott.  The local branch of the 
NAACP, for example, consulted with the national organization in 1932 to discuss the lawfulness 
of boycotts; though they received approval to boycott, they chose not to and continued with 
indirect methods of persuasion.70 Most businesses ignored or politely turned down their requests, 
citing little need for change or a lack of skilled candidates. The NAACP still did not advocate 
street action but took to the courts to challenge segregation and job discrimination.71 As 
depression conditions set in and limited gains were achieved using traditional methods, Harlem 
became more receptive to radical approaches employing direct action.  
Black nationalists72 were some of the first to call for direct action. They represented 
members of every class, but included many middle class and professional blacks. Followers of 
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this philosophy supported a more radical approach to gain jobs for blacks by advancing the 
policy to “Buy Black.” Black Nationalists believed this would establish a level of economic 
independence and an increase in black jobs. Black merchants (many of West Indian origin) 
naturally gravitated to this idea and even launched advertising campaigns and distributed buttons 
promoting “Race Loyalty.”73 They urged customers to buy only black-owned stores. These 
efforts benefited the pockets of middle-class merchants but did little to increase jobs, leading 
others to turn against it. 
  As early as 1930, some began supporting a “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” 
campaign in Harlem, but it met with resistance from various groups.  In 1930, Joseph Bibb of the 
Chicago Whip spoke before the NYUL, advocating a “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” 
campaign. Some black business owners resisted this call to action because they feared that if 
white businesses hired blacks, they would lose business to these stores. Others resisted the 
movement, but for other reasons.  Some objected because they resisted the direct-action 
approach used in the campaign such as boycotts, soapbox speeches, and picketing. Many feared 
that direct action would lead to white backlash or disturb other labor efforts.  The Socialist Party 
and the Negro Labor Committee feared it because it might hinder blacks from integration into 
the AFL.  The Communist Party in Harlem battled against it as well. Communists feared it would 
become racially antagonistic, and tried to redirect efforts that affected all workers. By 1935, 
successes would ultimately lead them to join in with the efforts.74 Even one of the local black 
newspapers, The Amsterdam News, claimed that these actions could lead to an increase in 
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discrimination and segregation outside Harlem; even if every business in Harlem hired blacks by 
the thousands in Harlem, there would still be unemployed, they argued.75  This resistance to 
confronting businesses directly led many to form new organizations. These groups would later 
join forces in the form of the Citizens’ League for Fair Play, and they launched a truly unified 
“Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” campaign that united people of all backgrounds in Harlem 
by employing direct and highly visible actions on the streets against white-owned businesses. 
Harlem Moves to Boycott 
The motivation to start the league came from a controversial figure in Harlem, Bishop 
Amiru Al-Mu-Minin Sufi Abdul Hamid. He had been an active participant in Chicago’s “Don’t 
Buy Where You Can’t Work Movement,” helping to secure 300 jobs in two months and 1,800 
jobs between 1928 and 1930 through his picketing efforts.76 Sufi Abdul Hamid hoped to bring 
his talents to New York and form a similar movement in Harlem.   
Sufi Abdul Hamid was a controversial figure of mysterious origins. It is believed that his 
given name was Eugene Brown, but he was called “black Hitler” by local Harlem merchants and 
newspapers who asserted his efforts were motivated by anti-Semitism.  He represented the 
element of Harlem interested in more direct action. Claude McKay described him as a 
“powerfully built black man” whose slogan was “More Jobs for Negroes: Buy Where You Can 
Work.”77   In an interview for the Works Project Administration, he claimed to have traveled at 
the age of nine to Egypt before moving to Athens, Greece, where he was educated. In 1923, he 
returned to the US and soon found himself in Chicago, where he led picketing efforts.78  Later, 
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he traveled to Harlem and set out to create a similar effort there. He led the charge through 
soapbox oratories and the formation of the Negro Industrial and Clerical Alliance (NICA), which 
led boycotts and picketing throughout Harlem.79 Sufi Abdul Hamid, unable to compel 
conservative leaders at the Baptist Ministerial Conference to join his cause, began his own 
boycott campaign with members of NICA.   
Incapable of gaining support from local community organizations, Hamid, in 1932, began 
pushing for economic equality on street corners. Hamid enlisted followers by shouting 
inflammatory messages directed at white proprietors’ stores and yelling “share the jobs,” and 
comparing Harlem to Chicago.80 His message would later contain anti-Semitic content when it 
was reported that most businesses along 125th Street were owned by Jews.  He was accused of 
stating that “All Jews are syphilitic and consumptive” and are “spreading their filth and disease 
all through Harlem.”81  His controversial methods quickly drew the ire of the middle class and 
the elite. This attitude was reflected in an article printed in the New York Age, which described 
his methods as a “disturbance,” though they did not mention him directly by name.  Sharing this 
view was journalist and writer Roi Ottley, who said Hamid “harangued the crowd with some 
truth and much steam” and that his followers were mere “hoodlums.”82  Despite this description, 
Hamid managed to the draw support of those who suffered most during the Depression and soon 
launched picketing along 135th Street.  
Once Hamid drew enough followers, he began targeting prominent businesses along 
135th Street in the summer of 1933.  The center of Harlem’s business district originated on 135th 
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Street, though by 1935, it had shifted to 125th Street, as black Harlem expanded. Sufi and 
members of NICA established their movement from the Hotel Dumas located on 135th Street and 
Seventh Avenue. From there, they targeted nearly every white-owned business along 135th 
Street, from drug stores, to grocery stores and department stores. He won no major victories, but 
did gain some positions for his members along 135th Street. Hamid soon took this experience to a 
larger audience and wealthier enemies down toward 125th Street.  Beginning in May 1934, 
Hamid shifted his focus to white-owned businesses there, including major chain stores and drew 
the attention of the black middle class and black elites.  
“Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” Moves to 125th Street 
Sufi Abdul Hamid wasted no time when he singled out businesses on 125th Street by 
taking direct action. Hamid’s NICA affiliates met with store owners and management demanding 
they hire various percentages of black staff.  Their efforts were immediately rebuffed and even 
met with racist messages. Woolworth’s Five & Ten Cent Store manager retorted that he was 
from the south “where Negroes were not permitted even to buy goods from first class stores and 
as long as he was manager, ‘not a damned nigger’ would serve anything over his counter, even if 
the customers were ‘Niggers.’”83  Hamid’s response was to launch a full picketing campaign 
along 125th Street. These actions would result in his arrest, along with 14 of his followers four 
months later.84 Their methods not only gained the attention of management and the police, but 
also of the black middle class and elite.  Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was part of a father-son duo, 
which led the largest church in the country, the Abyssinian Baptist Church. Powell quickly 
renounced Sufi Hamid’s actions from his pulpit.    
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Hamid rapidly forced the middle- and upper-class into action. Those of means in the 
community resented the tactics used by Hamid and hoped to bring respectability to the jobs 
campaign and gain control of the rising campaign.85 One of the first attempts to rein in the job’s 
movement was undertaken by Effa Manley.  She was a prominent black businesswoman who 
would become the owner of the black baseball team, the Eagles, earning her a spot in the 
National Baseball Hall of Fame in Cooperstown, NY.  She headed the Harlem Women’s 
Association and directed their efforts to secure jobs for black workers. She petitioned local black 
ministers to assist her in taking action. Reverend John Johnson of Saint Martin’s Protestant 
Episcopal Church was the first to answer the call. Though he supported developing more jobs for 
blacks, he believed the movement needed an “element of Christian kindliness” which he thought 
Hamid’s NICA lacked.86 Enlisting the help of the publisher of the New York Age, Fred Moore, 
Reverend Johnson would host a meeting calling for the start of the Citizens’ League for Fair 
Play. This group would arise from the merging of efforts of eighteen churches and forty-four 
groups that ranged in interest from women’s groups and business organizations to members of 
Black Nationalist groups such as the African Patriotic League. Together they decided to direct 
their efforts at Blumstein’s Department Store, the largest in Harlem. 
Members of the black bourgeoisie, under the direction of Reverend Johnson as president, 
and Manley, the secretary of the Citizen’s League, initially applied conservative methods to 
exact change from Blumstein’s. They appealed to local households to save receipts from 
purchases at the store.  In a short time, they collected $5,000 in receipts, which they presented to 
the owner and manager. The proprietors felt that the complaints were unjustified. Shockingly, 
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Blumstein’s responded by confirming that although seventy-five percent of their sales came from 
black customers, they saw absolutely no need to hire more black workers since they already had 
a few black janitors and elevator operators,’ one with a Master’s degree. They saw no need to 
hire more since they met their commitment to the community by donating to black charities.87 
The Citizen’s League realized that adhering strictly to traditional methods of persuasion was no 
longer an option. 
The New York Age launched the “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” campaign on June 
2, 1934. The newspaper appealed to its readers to stop buying from Blumstein’s until fifty 
percent of their employees were black.  Their arguments were angry in tone and targeted Mrs. 
L.M. Blumstein directly, saying, “As a Jew she is much concerned with Hitler’s oppression of 
her people, but as that same Jew, she oppresses the hell out of the Negroes.”  They also presented 
the fight as representing far more than a squabble with Blumstein’s, but reflecting a larger fight 
for black rights.  They professed that black businesses floundered, while discriminatory white 
businesses flourished, and that if action was not taken now, their children would only suffer, 
unable to make a decent living in the future.88 The Citizens League and the New York Age then 
sponsored a meeting to organize a concerted effort among the community.  
The “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” campaign found tremendous support from 
members of every background in the community.  Evidence of this support could be seen at the 
first official community-wide meeting to expand job opportunities in Harlem.  Held in Reverend 
Johnson’s church, it brought together 2,000 people on June 17, 1934. It encompassed 
representatives of forty-four organizations, including distinguished individuals with connections 
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to every economic and political group.   Some prominent faces in attendance were Adam Clayton 
Powell, Jr., who brought with him the backing of all 14,000 members of his church; Rudolf 
Smith of the UNIA; Arthur Schomburg, curator of the New York Public Library; and attorney 
and son of an NAACP executive, William Pickens.  Even Sufi Hamid sent representatives to 
ascertain the course this new effort would take.  Within weeks, they had support from over 300 
groups who donated their time and money to the cause. These groups included women’s and 
business organizations, as well as members of Black Nationalist groups such as the African 
Patriotic League. These organizations represented and appealed to a wide assemblage of people 
from every economic class, social base, and political leaning.  Even Hamid and his supporters 
began picketing in front of Blumstein’s, though his presence was rebuked by the league. The 
onset of this unified movement created conditions that could initiate an effective labor campaign, 
which until this point had achieved little success because of vastly different approaches and 
goals.   
To achieve their objectives, the Citizens League took a two-front approach comprised of 
picketing and propaganda. A picketing committee was set up under the direction of Arthur Reid 
and Ira Kemp.  They solicited volunteers and canvased the streets daily. The picketing would last 
for months with 140 regular attendees (mostly women) picketing. Weekly meetings garnered 
attendance that ranged from 400 to 1500 attendees. It aimed to rally support, and discuss 
progress and tactics.89    The New York Age led the media campaign.  It printed weekly articles 
that praised the group’s supporters and successes, while lambasting their enemies. Supporters 
were rewarded by having their names published each week and articles announced their 
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successes.90 These efforts created a constant visual presence that drew more and more people to 
the cause.  
Though it drew the support of the majority of the community, it faced harsh criticism 
from Harlem’s leading black weekly, the New York Amsterdam News.  In editorials and articles, 
the paper openly condemned the effort, arguing that white employers downtown and in other 
areas outside of black neighborhoods might retaliate against black employees by firing them.91 
Their condemnation of the campaign, however, may have been driven more by economic 
motives than by concern for black workers.  The paper printed the bulk of Blumstein’s 
advertisements and a substantial amount of all of the advertisements for businesses along 125th 
Street. Supporting the boycott would have meant a huge loss of revenue for the paper.92 While 
the New York Age and the New York Amsterdam News fought over the value of the jobs 
campaign, Hamid achieved the first success in gaining black employment on 125th Street.   
 Hamid achieved the first momentous triumph from an important 125th Street merchant.   
He won over the new owner of Koch’s Department Store. Koch’s previous owners closed their 
125th Street location rather than cater to black customers, but its new owner Morris Weinstein 
agreed that his staff would be one-third black by the time of their grand reopening.  Though he 
and his members rejoiced, not all in Harlem shared this excitement.  His victory was met with 
indifference by some and criticism from others. In the Amsterdam News, it merited only two 
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sentences, while the New York Age asserted that it was Koch’s paying “protection money” to 
Sufi Hamid’s followers.93 
Though the Citizens League for Fair Play chided Hamid and his followers, the picketing 
committee under the direction of Ira Kemp and Arthur Reid used questionable methods of their 
own. Ira Kemp was born in Macon, Georgia, and Arthur Reid in Barbados; they represented a 
slightly more radical part of Harlem. They were Black Nationalists and founders of the African 
Patriotic League. Both subscribed to ideas of the Garvey Movement and would later go on to 
found the Harlem Labor Union.94 As they guided the campaign on the streets, they did not 
hesitate to take more direct action than conservative leaders would have approved. Reports to 
management of shoppers being verbally and physically harassed were not uncommon.  In some 
instances, picketers were arrested for harassment and intimidation. The New York Age blamed 
such outbursts on Hamid’s followers, rather than the league’s own members.95 Methods may 
have pushed the boundaries of the conservative leaders of the league, but the possibilities of 
success pushed mass picketers into daily action and were beginning to affect business. 
The New York Age also did its part to intimidate people who dared to cross picket lines.  
Black shoppers who did so were often harassed.  For example, shoppers sometimes found their 
pictures on the cover of the New York Age, as one did on July 14, 1934, with the caption, “In the 
photo to the left is a Harlem ‘citizen’ who had just made a purchase in Blumstein’s.”96 As a 
result, shoppers faced public humiliation and embarrassment. 
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Blumstein’s Department Store was forced to take action and capitulated to the demands 
of the Citizens’ League for Fair Play.   After months of picketing, Blumstein’s agreed to draft an 
agreement with the League. Blumstein’s would agree to hire 35 new employees for clerical and 
sales positions. They also vowed that as new positions opened, they would be filled with black 
workers.  This news was heralded in the headlines of the New York Age on August 4, 1934.  In 
the New York Age, Blumstein’s declared that they had never discriminated, but that they were 
doing it as “recognition of the principles asserted by Rev. Dr. J.H. Johnson.”97  Though this 
number was less than the fifty percent they demanded, the league accepted the offer since 
Blumstein’s had agreed to hire more black staff as new openings arose.  
Harlem’s black community rejoiced in this triumph by hosting a parade through the 
streets of Harlem. Revelers marched down Lenox Avenue toward 110th Street. That day, 
approximately 1500 refused to leave Lenox Avenue, even though organizers had tried to 
postpone the celebratory parade.98 Motivated by this success, boycotts and demonstrations 
rapidly spread to other establishments located around 125th Street, though the league would 
never officially endorse another boycott and chose to return to the methods of privately 
negotiating with stores.   
Fracture Threatens Movements Victory 
September 15, 1934, the day the first black clerks of Blumstein’s were announced, should 
have also been a day of celebration for the people of Harlem, but it brought anger and division to 
the community. Instead, the New York Age proudly boasted about the first 15 girls who were 
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hired at Blumstein’s.99 Readers were quick to note that all the new employees had a light 
complexion.  Kemp was outraged by the selection.  He described the girls as “High Yellow,” 
easily passing as Caucasian, and he immediately confronted Fred Moore with accusations of 
aiding Blumstein’s in discriminating against dark-skinned girls.100 This was particularly 
egregious to Kemp since most picketing was done by darker-skinned blacks.101 Kemp and Reid 
felt that black elite agents of the League had used them to improve the conditions of the black 
upper class and secretly promoted their own candidates, while lower-class and dark-skinned 
picketers did the work. The deal indeed was agreed upon in Blumstein’s offices while Kemp and 
Reid picketed on the street below.  In response, Kemp and Reid terminated their affiliation with 
the League and resumed protests, creating an independent picketing committee.  
Sufi Hamid, always an outsider to the League, was also unwilling to accept the deal and 
trudged on with NICA members. He argued that the agreement was not enforceable and believed 
that church members shared the same prejudices as store owners. He continued to send NICA 
representatives to picket Blumstein’s and other stores along 125th Street. In response, local 
proprietors decided to band together to resist Hamid’s picketing and speeches, and formed the 
Harlem Merchants Association.  They appealed to Mayor LaGuardia to intercede, claiming 
Hamid was promoting anti-Semitism among picketers and pushed for him to be arrested again.  
He persisted, but without the backing of the community, no gains were made, and the effort 
quickly fizzled.  
Creating further anger and division in Harlem was not just the creation of two rogue 
picketing committees, but the response of the League and the New York Age. Representatives of 
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the League such as Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., did not deny that the girls selected by Blumstein 
were lighter in skin tone than most of the picketers, but they denied this was a result of League 
bias. They even asserted that it was the quality of the printed picture that projected a complexion 
that was lighter than reality.102  The New York Age’s editor only added fuel to the anger.  In an 
editorial, he conceded that the girls had fair skin, but argued that people should accept it because 
lighter skin girls could create a “foothold” for others in time.103 This did little to assuage the 
anger of the community and only pushed people out of the League, thus ending any chance of a 
unified jobs movement in Harlem.  
A.S. Beck Shoe Corporation V John Johnson 
As factions developed in the employment campaign, resistance from businesses came in 
the form of the court case, A.S. Beck Shoe Corporation v John Johnson. In October 1934, A.S 
Beck Shoe Corporation ran multiple locations in Harlem, and was targeted in the second wave of 
boycotts and picketing. Management sought an injunction to prevent any further protests. The 
complaint listed eight charges against them, including impeding business, loitering, using 
intimidations and threats against customers and staff, and unjustly calling a boycott of their store. 
The case named several defendants including John Johnson and Arthur Reid (spelled Reed in 
court transcripts).104   
Testimony reflected both methods used by Ira Kemp’s picketing faction and resistance of 
businesses to hire black staff.  Patrons and representatives of picketed businesses, such as 
Blumstein’s and La Gene Shop, confirmed that 50 to 60 picketers appeared daily and made it 
difficult to enter the stores along 125th Street.   Some witnesses, such as customer Mary Cannon, 
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even reported being physically assaulted by participants. Kemp also pressured business owners 
to hire members of the APL. He insisted that half of local store employees should be members of 
the APL.  A deponent, manager Jack B. Kahn, affirmed these tactics and reflected the typical 
response of shops in Harlem, insisting that they could not find that many black workers who 
were qualified and doing so would require firing white staff.  When stores did not comply, 
boycotts were called, picketing commenced, leaflets were distributed, and rallies were held. 
Documents of these events were offered into evidence and demonstrated a clear pattern of 
activity. 
As testimony and evidence were presented, it was also clear that by the time of the trial 
the movement was divided.  Johnson testified that Kemp and Reid were no longer a part of his 
League and that the picket committee had been disbanded.  Kemp and Reid denied any 
knowledge of being removed from their association with the League. A divide over skin color 
was also reflected in the testimony. Violet Dewey was a light-skinned black woman. She 
testified that she and her employers were harassed by Kemp and his supporters.   They spoke to 
her manager and demanded her removal and replacement with a sales girl of their choosing; 
when asked why, they stated that she was “too light.”   She was eventually let go as a result of 
this repeated harassment. Such demands were supported by Kemp, but not by conservative 
League members such as Johnson. 
A.S. Beck’s lawyers also presented into evidence an article printed in the New York Age 
to demonstrate the lack of support for the campaign. The paper, which had once extolled 
picketing, was now condemning it. The plaintiff’s lawyer claimed it showed the community did 
not support picketing in the area. When the court finally ruled on the case, it would serve as the 
death knell to a movement that was already divided. 
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The “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” movement would lose all leveraging power as 
an outcome of the case, and with that any hope of gaining future success evaporated.  The court 
ruled in favor of the plaintiff.  The defendants would have to reimburse A.S. Beck $500 as a 
result, but the true loss came when the judge declared all picketing and boycotts had to end 
permanently. The “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” campaigns tactics were declared illegal 
since this dispute, according to the court, was not a labor dispute. The court ruled that organizers 
and participants were not a union and therefore had no right to protest, picket, or boycott.  Judge 
Samuel Rosenman further explained why he believed such efforts needed to be quelled. His 
explanation foreshadowed events to come. He stated “their acts are contrary to public policy in 
that they tend to incite race riots…foster racial strife and to foment racial dispute.”105  This 
would serve a fatal blow to the movement.  
The effects of the court’s decisions were felt rapidly. Newspapers printed the outcome on 
the front page and by early 1935, all picketing had ended.106  Arrests were quickly made when 
picketers appeared. Sufi Hamid, after being arrested again, dissolved his organization. The 
disappearance of jobs soon followed. Jobs gained through the movement were being lost as early 
as January 1935.107  The impact of the case was not felt immediately as the decision came at the 
start of the holiday season and merchants feared a loss of sales. Members of the Harlem 
Merchants Association, confident in their victory, met with League members at a banquet, 
boasting that they had hired black employees for the holiday. This statement irked listeners who 
were quick to point out that, just as swiftly as they hired these seasonal employees, they had fired 
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them once the season was over.108  Efforts of all groups were called off and within a month’s 
time, 400 of the newly hired black clerks would lose their jobs.109   
Reid and Kemp responded to the decision by forming their own labor union, the Harlem 
Labor Union, but government and business efforts thwarted its success. Their efforts to unionize 
would be blocked until after the riot, and the union would be permanently dissolved after they 
began to advocate more radical activities, alarming merchants, black elites, and government 
officials. They were asked to resign by the District Attorney of New York County.110  With no 
avenues left to express their frustrations, Harlem was ripe with exasperation that would soon lead 
to conflict. 
Harlem’s Riot of 1935 
On March 19, 1935, a small occurrence at Kress Variety Store would evolve into a full-
blown riot. The precipitating incident concerned a petty theft.  Lino Rivera, described as a 
sixteen-year-old “Puerto Rican Negro” went into a local variety store on 125th Street, where he 
attempted to steal a small penknife and was caught by store employees who held him.111  Rivera 
was held by an employee who began pushing him toward the exit when people began to observe 
the exchange. At this point, Rivera stated that one of the workers said, “Let’s take him down to 
the cellar and beat him up.”112 A woman observing the situation began to scream. Others began 
to stop and watch. Another clerk stepped in to assist, and both men began arguing with and 
dragging the boy who was clinging to a pillar, shouting and kicking, before biting both men.113    
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This minor incident would spark rumors and increase tensions. Rivera was taken to the 
basement and a local police officer spoke with him. The boy was released and left out the back 
door and returned home. Meanwhile, the crowd that had seen the exchange became incensed, 
and one of the witnesses insisted the boy was being beaten to death in the basement.  This 
statement quickly spread. In response, angry crowds began to gather inside and outside the store, 
waiting for the boy to reappear. The police were called. They tried to disperse the crowd, further 
agitating participants and leading police to call for reinforcements. When the boy did not come 
out from the basement, the crowd became alarmed and angry.   
Exacerbating the situation were a series of unfortunate events.  An ambulance was called 
to address the wounds of the bitten employee.  When the ambulance left empty, it appeared to 
prove the woman’s claim.   Lending further evidence to the rumor of the boy’s death was the 
presence of a hearse which was parked in front of the store. The hearse was normally stored at a 
garage on 124th Street, but had been parked there by the driver who was visiting his brother-in-
law at the store.  This confirmed to some that the boy was dead.  
Street orators began to arrive at the scene and further stirred the crowd’s anger. 
Pamphlets began to circulate, reading: “One hour ago a twelve-year-old Negro boy was brutally 
beaten by the management at Kress’s Five and Ten Cent Store. Boy is near death… Don’t buy at 
Kress! Stop police brutality in Harlem!”114 Other rumors had spread that he was twelve and had 
stolen jellybeans and was beaten as a result.115  A riot participant acknowledged the rumors, but 
believed parts of the rumors four years later.  This witness stated, “Sure, the kid swiped a fist a 
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candy. I guess he musta been hungry. That wuz the startin' point. Hell came after that. Word got 
aroun' the kid wuz murdered. That's all they needed t'know.”116 Indeed, these rumors fomented 
the crowd. 
After the store had closed, crowds refused to leave, and became destructive. They 
numbered in the thousands and began to smash windows and loot white-owned stores along 
125th Street from Fifth to Eighth Avenue.  More police were called. The violence seemed to stem 
from outside of Kress’s as onlookers listened to fiery speeches. Objects were launched from the 
crowd shattering Kress’s windows. Looters quickly flooded into the store and ransacked it. 
Rioting soon spread to other stores along 125th Street.  More than 500 police officers responded 
to the scene on foot and mounted on horses. Nightsticks and gun butts were used on rioters, as 
people on rooftops threw bricks, bottles, and bats on the officers. In an attempt to end the riot, 
police located Rivera and brought him back to Kress to prove he was alive. The riotous mass 
continued, however, spreading south to 120th Street and North to 138th Street.  
The rioters did not represent any single group and were not hoodlums or communists, as 
people speculated afterward. Thousands had participated in the riots. Poor, middle-class, and 
prominent had all partaken, including a minister’s daughter who allegedly hurled bricks through 
windows.117 Various age groups were also represented in the crowd, though not in equal 
numbers. Though communist members were present, giving speeches at the start of the riots, 
they were calling for boycotts, not riots.   
Many tried to minimize the damage during the riot, to no avail.  Store owners posted 
signs in the window, touting that they hired blacks or were black-owned.  Radio stations and 
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sound trucks blared messages, calling on rioters to stop. Police blocked street traffic and tried to 
track the crowd. All efforts failed to bring order.  Seven police and fifty-seven civilians were 
injured, while 626 windows were broken and seventy-five (mostly black) people were arrested 
for crimes that ranged from felonious mischief to inciting a riot.118 
 Though Rivera had not died that night, another sixteen-year-old boy had tragically 
perished.  Lloyd Hobbs, who was returning home from a movie, had been fatally shot by a police 
officer.  Hobbs was caught in a crowd when an officer opened fire, striking the boy. Despite this 
incident, police efforts were not excessively violent, according to Claude McKay who described 
their actions: “The actions of the police was commendable to the highest degree.  The looting 
was brazen and daring, but the police were restrained. In the extreme cases, when they fired, it 
was into the air. Their restraint saved Harlem from becoming a shambles.”119 Less than twenty-
four hours later, the riot had come to an end, leaving behind approximately $2,000,000 in 
damages.120  The riot forced the government and the community to respond.  
The Response to the Riot of 1935 
Some of the first to respond to the riots were the people of Harlem themselves who saw it 
as a result of economic oppression and the failure of the jobs movement.  Local leaders and 
ordinary citizens of Harlem reacted to the incident by declaring it not a race riot but a clear retort 
to the demise of the “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work Movement.” Heads of the community 
condemned the actions of the race riot and yet justified it.  Claude McKay claimed the “alleged 
beating of a kid caught stealing a trifle in one of the stores merely served to explode the 
                                               
118 Greenberg, “Politics of Disorder,” 408. 
119 Claude McKay, “Harlem Runs Wild” in David Levering Lewis, The Portable Harlem Renaissance Reader, ed. 
David Levering Lewis (New York: Viking, 1994), 190. 
120 Hofstadter and Wallace, ed., American Violence, 259. 
   
42 
 
smoldering discontent of the colored people against the Harlem merchants.” 121  McKay further 
blamed agitators who had organized picketing, specifically naming Sufi Hamid.  Reverend John 
Johnson, blamed the actions solely on the merchants themselves for antagonizing the 
communities by declaring false promises and then continuing to practice discrimination.  He 
asserted that what happened was “an economic revolt. A revolt against the prejudice, 
exploitation and unfair practices of many of the stores on 125th Street…Some have 
PRETENDED TO ACCEPT THE SUGGESTIONS MADE, but have lied and cheated.”122 The 
riots were not spontaneous, but a response to businesses that refused opportunities to the people 
of Harlem. 
Even some local merchants found that the true issue was stores’ refusal to heed the 
demands for jobs for black workers.  The head of Koch’s Department Store asserted that they 
received “the finest compliment” when their store was “unmolested” during the riots and 
attributed this (along with improved sales) to the hiring of black workers.123  Similarly, 
Blumstein’s was not attacked and was one of the only stores that had maintained newly hired 
black clerks following the holiday season. Letters and telegrams, which poured into the mayor’s 
office, demanded the release of “workers.” Some directly stated that “THE WORKERS OF 
HARLEM HAVE A RIGHT TO PROTEST DISCRIMINATION AGAINST NEGRO 
WORKERS…,” while others wrote to offer aid to the mayor and to join the committee to 
investigate problems in Harlem.124  
                                               
121 McKay, “Harlem Runs Wild”, 191. 
122 Fred Moore, ed., “Leaders Comment on Riot” New York Age, March 30, 1935, America’s Historical Newspapers 
Readex: A Division of NewsBank: New York Age, 1.  
123 Ibid. 
124 Telegram to Mayor LaGuardia from American Youth Club, March 20, 1935, Mayor LaGuardia Papers of the 
New York City Municipal Archives, Office of the Mayor (Fiorello H. LaGuardia) Guinier, Ewarts (7) to Harlem-
Crimes (13) Subject Files 1934-1945, reel 0076. 
   
43 
 
Other organizations and events cited jobs as the root of Harlem’s frustration. Rallies held 
later in response to the riots and accusations of police brutality all indicated job concerns.125  The 
NAACP also blamed the actions on “economic distress” and called for the formation of a biracial 
committee on the Harlem riots, which would explore conditions in Harlem.126 Mayor LaGuardia 
was quick to form a committee. 
Mayor LaGuardia, who had once been touted as a “friend to the Negro,” quickly took 
action both during and after the riot.127   LaGuardia went to Harlem in the following days to 
address the community, but had police riding through the streets during the riot with photos of 
the boy, unharmed. Approximately 700 officers were held on duty during the riot and extra 
police guarded stores in the area afterward. The officers were directed to use minimal force.  On 
March 20, 1935, LaGuardia wrote an address to the people of New York City, which assured the 
public that the vast majority of Harlem residents were “splendid, decent, law-abiding American 
citizens.” He promised a full inquiry. As part of the investigative process, he created a committee 
representing all citizens to investigate the riot and recommend ways to address the community’s 
grievances.    
This committee was known as The Mayor’s Commission on Conditions in Harlem.  The 
committee featured prominent members of the black community, including civil rights leader 
and labor organizer A. Philip Randolph and sociologist E. Franklin Frazier.  The committee was 
divided into six subcommittees and investigated the following: unemployment discrimination, 
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inequality in relief, housing conditions, poor educational and recreational facilities, problems in 
healthcare, police abuse, and crime, among other things.   
The report found many injustices, particularly in unemployment and housing. It noted 
discrimination in employment in all sectors. According to the committee, this discrimination 
created conditions that would guarantee “perpetual unemployment and dependence upon welfare 
agencies.”128  They also charged that though it did not discriminate when issuing relief aid, the 
agency discriminated against hiring black employees and failed to appoint blacks to works 
projects even when qualified.129 They recommended an unpaid black individual be appointed to 
oversee discrimination in the Home Relief Bureau.   Regarding housing, they found poor 
conditions that led to overcrowding, and learned that most families paid half their income in rent 
as a result of discrimination.  They recommended increased enforcement of city housing codes.  
The committee additionally recommended that the New York Housing Authority should develop 
a program specific to Harlem, and it encouraged rent strikes if landlords refused to address 
occupants’ protests regarding rents and poor conditions.130 
The state of education in Harlem and recreational facilities were also addressed. The 
committee found inadequate access to recreational facilities. Schools were found to be 
dilapidated and inadequately supplied.  They also suspected that teachers viewed being placed in 
these schools as a form of “punishment,” and that most of the teachers were old white females, 
which showed less concern for students’ needs.131 Testimony before the committee revealed 
repeated discrimination in schools.132 The group found that the physical conditions of Harlem 
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schools did not match those offered to children in other parts of the city.  In order to remedy 
these problems, the committee recommended that the city tear down and replace PS 89, appeal to 
Washington, D.C., for emergency funding to build more facilities, and hire more teachers to 
reduce class size. They also recommended building new parks and expanding park hours to 
allow people more access. 133 Similarly, the committee recommended hiring soldiers to supervise 
parks. Additionally, they suggested hiring a black individual to the board of education, when 
possible.  
 Healthcare was also an area of serious concern.   The committee asserted that residents in 
Harlem were in worse health than in other parts of the city, due to overcrowding and poverty.  
The findings revealed hospitals lacked proper supervision and were overcrowded. The kitchens 
in hospitals lacked proper refrigeration.134  The committee also noted that black doctors and 
nurses were blocked from jobs.  They recommended that black doctors and nurses be hired in all 
municipal hospitals and that employment discrimination in city-funded facilities be prohibited. 
Likewise, the panel recommended increasing the number of students in the training program at 
Harlem Hospital and demanded nurses at this location receive comparable training.135 
 With respect to police and crime, a number of issues were observed.  According to the 
study, the increased crime in the area was the result of the other issues. The report found that 
contributing conditions such as chronic unemployment, poor living conditions, and lack of 
educational and recreational facilities led to increased crime.   The committee mentioned 
examples of excessive force and instances of killings, which helped create the negative attitude 
of community members against law enforcement.136 Recommendations to alleviate these issues 
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included creating a biracial committee of community members to review complaints of 
mistreatment, closing institutions that refused to admit blacks, and instructing officers not to 
interfere with “the association of whites and Negroes” or otherwise be subjected to disciplinary 
actions.137 
 The report would never be released publicly by the mayor’s office, as promised, in part, 
because of its findings and recommendations.  Public knowledge of the report’s content resulted 
when the Amsterdam News obtained a copy and reprinted it.  
The Board of Education responded by denying any form of discrimination. It postulated 
that problems found in Harlem schools were present throughout the school system. It contended 
that schools were not particularly overcrowded in Harlem, but that schools there had fewer 
pupils as a result of children moving due to the Depression.  They also declared teachers had not 
been placed there for punitive reasons and that issues related to discipline and learning were a 
result of broken homes and poverty.138   
The relief administration also denied any form of discrimination. It emphasized that the 
low number of black employees was not evidence of discrimination. They insisted that the 
number of blacks in New York represented a smaller percentage of the population than whites, 
which is why the relief administration had fewer black employees. Addressing an allegation of 
discrimination in promotions within the administration, it claimed that a qualified black 
employee was never denied a promotion based on color. The administration did, however, admit 
to denying a promotion to one black employee because the candidate would be placed in a 
position in a predominantly Italian community. Supervisors felt the appointment might stir 
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tensions due to the outbreak of the Italian-Ethiopian War.139  Despite these objections to the 
report, however, the city and state took steps to assuage the suffering of Harlem. 
The Mayor and other officials took actions even before the full report was released.  The 
state set up its own temporary group to explore conditions for blacks.  In order to address issues 
of discrimination, the Emergency Relief Board established an Advisory Committee on the Negro 
Problem. It successfully increased the number of jobs for blacks in positions with higher 
responsibilities and the head of the Works Projects Administration took similar action.140 
Healthcare in Harlem received a boost with the launch of a new health center. Moreover, Harlem 
Hospital received a new wing called the Women’s Pavilion at Harlem Hospital, and city 
hospitals agreed to accept black nurses.141  Educational needs were addressed by the city, as well.  
The government would propose four new schools in Harlem. They failed to meet these promises, 
however, by only building two.142  
 Housing projects were also launched as a result of the riots, though not without 
controversy.  The first black housing project would be created in the form of the Harlem River 
Houses just two months after the riot.143  It was launched as a twin project of the Williamsburg 
Houses, which was already being designed for whites. Designing this project proved to be 
difficult for the city, since whites did not want blacks in their communities or to enter the 
Williamsburg Housing project already underway. The cost of land in black areas was higher, 
however, due to higher rents.144 The city felt that the cost of buying land in black areas would 
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betoo exorbitant for the city’s budget. This issue was rectified when they found a plot of vacant 
land adjacent to the Harlem River. The projects provided better housing for some, but still did 
little to reduce the demand for adequate housing in Harlem, which remained a major concern for 
residents nearly a decade later.  
 The “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” Movement also saw a boost as a result of the 
riots. It renewed activism in the community, and by 1938, the Supreme Court had ruled picketing 
to address racial inequalities was constitutional. The movement next won an important 
agreement with Harlem store owners, who agreed to hire blacks in white-collar and clerk 
positions until they reached one-third of their staff.145 Stores were held to these promises this 
time and even launched advertising campaigns promoting their inclusive hiring practices.   
Blacks later won victories as telephone operators, bus drivers, and white-collar positions in 
Consolidated Edison as a result of renewed black activism.146 The campaign had come full circle 
and began addressing unifying issues of concern for Harlem’s black residents. 
 As a result of the “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” campaign, Harlem had launched 
itself into a riot and had created a greater political consciousness of its needs.  The conditions of 
the Depression had increased the awareness of the need for all of Harlem’s black residents to 
secure jobs, whether white-collar or otherwise.  Unified under the Citizens’ for Fair Play, 
Harlem’s residents of varying skin colors, backgrounds, and economic classes had presented a 
campaign that focused all of Harlem on a joint concern over employment opportunities. When 
these efforts failed due to internal conflict and governmental road blocks, citizens’ anger resulted 
in a riot. This uprising of citizens finally brought government and business attention to the 
challenges faced by Harlem.  Though they failed to institute all the recommendations of the 
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committee, some needed changes, including increased employment, came about as a result of the 
riot. 
Conclusion 
 The people of Harlem grew increasingly frustrated in 1935.  They had pursued peaceable 
methods of enacting change in their community and addressed the injustice of discrimination in 
employment.  The initial limited success of their efforts managed to raise expectations. When the 
actions of businesses and government halted and reversed progress, however, the exasperation of 
the people of Harlem led individuals to unleash their anger by targeting businesses.    
 Harlem in 1935 was an ostracized and exploited community. Businesses thrived on 
account of black customers, while unemployment rates for black Harlemites were 
disproportionally high. Moreover, shopkeepers charged higher than average prices for 
necessities.   Additionally, black residents paid oppressively high rents for poor housing, which 
helped line the wallets of white absentee landlords.  Though the Harlem community needed more 
assistance than any other area in New York City during the Depression, its marginalized status 
prevented it from obtaining assistance from government agencies and employers.   
 Harlemites attempted to use conventional methods to improve their status. The 
community formed and joined organizations such as the Harlem Housewife’s League, the New 
York Urban League, the NAACP, and even the Communist Party, in an attempt to gain agency 
in their community.  Such groups endeavored to speak with proprietors, collected receipts, and 
attempted to appeal not only to owners’ goodwill, but also to businesses' bottom line by 
highlighting black residents’ contribution to these establishments. But these conventional means 
were unsuccessful at overcoming management’s discriminatory practices. With no signs of 
change, the people of Harlem turned to a more drastic course of action, pursuing the “Don’t Buy 
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Where You Can’t Work” campaign. Chicago not only served as an example for Harlem but 
furnished it with a radical leader that drove moderates to action.  Sufi Abdul Hamid, of the 
Chicago jobs campaign, had forced the hand and pocketbook of Harlem to take action. 
 Hamid galvanized people of every social class, economic class, and race to respond to the 
community’s demands for equitable employment opportunities.  He applied the methods he had 
learned in Chicago to the streets of Harlem.  He led street corner speeches and excited people 
toward direct action.  He enlisted followers to his organizations and led some of the earliest 
boycotts and picket lines on the streets of Harlem. His forceful, angry and sometimes anti-
Semitic message forced the community to take notice.  Some were compelled to join the cause. 
Businesses, in response, banded together to form the Harlem Merchants Association to eliminate 
Hamid and his followers, while conservatives responded to his call by starting their own 
campaign to regain control of their environment. 
 The outcome was a merging of radical and moderate forces into an umbrella organization 
known as the Citizens’ League for Fair Play, which would align the poor to the elite in a singular 
effort to receive access to jobs in Harlem.  The League would once again turn to Chicago’s 
model to achieve its goals.  Harlem would consolidate its resources to attack 125th Street’s 
bottom line.  It did this by forming a picketing committee and starting a propaganda campaign 
with the assistance of the New York Age.   The organization successfully brought together the 
majority of the community to exact pressure on the businesses of Harlem. 
 Though Harlem’s alliance was fragile, it managed to succeed.  The League’s first success 
brought together a diverse populace to target a singular goal.  It worked to drive down sales for 
Blumstein’s and (later) other stores on 125th Street. As a result, the League saw initial gains that 
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brought 400 new positions to blacks in Harlem.  After this initial success, this tentative union of 
competing interests soon fell apart.  
 Some of the most important dividing issues revolved around continued boycotts and 
perceived discrimination against blacks of darker complexion.  Elite leaders of the Citizens’ 
League for Fair Play wanted to negotiate with employers. These leaders accepted deals with 
businesses that agreed to hire only a small number of black workers. More radical elements 
preferred to push for continued boycotts until proprietors consented to employ a larger 
percentage of black staff.  The contradictory approaches and interests of conservative and radical 
leaders rendered the movement irreparable when the first black clerks at Blumstein’s appeared 
on the pages of the New York Age.  Many of the daily picketers were lower-class women of dark 
complexion, yet those hired for targeted stores were light-skinned people from middle-class 
backgrounds.  Picketers felt betrayed by their own organization. The discontent among 
participants splintered the group into competing factions. 
 Though job gains never reached the desired number of new positions, Harlem gained 
access to jobs that were never held before by black workers, though they were soon eliminated.  
Blacks gained jobs beyond those of menial labor. Some of these new positions were in places 
that had never hired black employees for such tasks.  This accomplishment, which had come to 
fruition in the summer and early fall of 1934, was all but eliminated by the winter of 1934.  
Though management held onto staff until early the following year, once the holiday rush 
subsided, black staff was terminated. 
 With no outlet left to vent frustrations, angry residents came together to riot as a result of 
a minor transgression between white management and a young boy of dark complexion.  When 
Lino Rivera stole a pocket knife, he inadvertently set off a chain of events that fed into Harlem’s 
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bubbling resentment.  As the Commission on the Harlem Riot would find in its report, in normal 
circumstances this incident would have quickly faded. But it did not “due to the feeling of 
insecurity produced by years of unemployment and deep-seated resentment against the many 
forms of discrimination which they [black Harlemintes] had suffered as a racial minority.”147   
 Indeed, the people of Harlem had been denied any outlet to convey their dissatisfaction 
and gain resolution.  They had sought to use peaceful methods for exacting change in 
employment practices by using the “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” movement.  The 
court’s injunction cut off access to the only successful medium that could force businesses to 
listen and act on community concerns.   When no means for change were left for the people of 
Harlem, their anger was directed at the stores on 125th Street.  This action forced New York City 
and its people to pay attention to the conditions and needs of Harlem, and to take minimal 
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